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P o l it ic a l  In s t it u t io n s  in
J .R .R .  T o l k i e n 's  M i d d l e - e a r t h :
O r ,  H o w  I  L e a r n e d  t o  S t o p  W o r r y i n g
A b o u t  t h e  L a c k  o f  D e m o c r a c y
D om in ic  J. N ard i, Jr.1
P o l i t ic a l  s c ie n t is ts  h a v e  s o m e tim e s  s t ru g g le d  with the depiction of 
politics in Tolkien's Middle-earth legendarium, especially with its treatment of 
democracy. The heroes fight to restore monarchy and seem skeptical of modern 
political values, such as equality and popular participation. Blackburn (64) even goes 
so far as to allege that Tolkien's characters possess a "naive" faith in enlightened 
despotism. However, the dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship/ 
authoritarianism overlooks important features of Middle-earth politics. The lack of 
formal democratic institutions does not mean that the citizens blindly accept 
despotism. Rather, I propose that we can better understand Tolkien's legendarium by 
focusing on the extent to which political relationships are institutionalized.
I begin the paper in Section 1 by justifying the need for a reevaluation of 
politics in Tolkien's legendarium. In Section 2, I demonstrate the problems with the 
dichotomy between authoritarianism and democracy both in real life and in 
speculative fiction. In Section 3, I discuss the treatment of democracy both in 
Tolkien's letters and in his legendarium. In Section 4, I examine how 
institutionalization varies across the Shire, Lake-town, Rohan, Gondor, Isengard, and 
Mordor. In Section 5, I attempt to provide a possible explanation for this variation 
using a game theoretic model. In Section 6, I speculate as to why immortality might 
make Elven politics more consensual. Finally, I conclude in Section 7 with a call for 
greater dialogue between political science and scholars of speculative fiction.
I have three goals in this paper. First, I hope to better understand—and at 
times correct misperceptions regarding—how Tolkien's worldview informed his 
literature. Tolkien's legendarium is not a political treatise, but his works do reflect 
concerns about political institutions. Second, I introduce new framework for 
understanding politics in Middle-earth. This should prove especially useful for 21st 
century readers, many of who likely—if unjustly—regard unconstitutional monarchy
1 This paper was the winner of the Alexei Kondratiev Student Paper Award at Mythcon 45, 
Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts.
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as equivalent to tyranny. This approach can also identify political variables 
overlooked in the existing literature. Finally, this paper is an experiment in 
application of political science to the study of speculative fiction. Applying existing 
analytical tools to radically different types of political systems forces political 
scientists to think carefully about the generalizability of and assumptions underlying 
those tools.
Naivete or Fantasy? The need for a reevaluation
There has been relatively little analysis of politics in Tolkien legendarium. 
One strain of scholarship criticizes the depiction of politics in Middle-earth as 
unrealistic or undemocratic. Barnett worries that The Lord of the Rings presents "a 
distorted picture of politics" because all decisions are resolved by consensus with 
little sign of debate (386). Blackburn alleges that the characters demonstrate "blind 
faith in [their] political leaders" (64).2 Other scholars have gone so far as to criticize 
Tolkien for promoting nationalism or fascism (see, e.g., Stimpson 8; Inglis 40). 
However, Curry (36-42) counters that a careful reading of the texts evinces little 
support for enlightened despotism, much less fascism. Tolkien himself strongly 
condemned Nazism (e.g., Letters 37).
One challenge to studying politics in Tolkien's legendarium is that the texts 
do not provide detailed information about political institutions. Ironically, Tolkien 
was not a terse writer; he famously included minute details about M iddle-earth 
geography and reprinted entire poems. Despite this, there is almost no mention of 
formal political institutions, such as legislatures or judicial systems. Political disputes are 
resolved through consensus or moral authority, not by reference to institutional rules 
rules or procedures. Given that Tolkien engaged in deliberate and careful world­
building, this omission is noteworthy and forces a closer reading of the text if we 
wish to truly understand political relationships in Tolkien's legendarium.
We should be wary of using "mundane world" history or ideology to "fill 
in" such gaps. Tolkien famously disliked "mere" allegory in fiction (e.g., Letters 
144), even warning that The Lord of the Rings "is neither allegorical nor topical" 
(The Lord of the Rings [LotR] Foreword xxiii). Just as readers should not equate the War 
of the Ring with World War II, it would also be an oversimplification to transpose 
all of our assumptions and stereotypes about historical monarchies onto Gondor or 
Rohan. Given the vast differences between the "mundane world" and Middle-
2 Game of Thrones author George R. R. Martin raises a similar critique:
Lord of the Rings had a very medieval philosophy [...]. Tolkien can say that Aragorn 
became king and reigned for a hundred years, and he was wise and good. But 
Tolkien doesn't ask the question: What was Aragorn's tax policy? [...] In real life, 
real-life kings had real-life problems to deal with. Just being a good guy was not the 
answer. You had to make hard, hard decisions. (Gilmore 2014)
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earth—including wizards and magic—it is not surprising that political institutions 
in Tolkien's legendarium do not always resemble our own.
Although Tolkien conceived of his legendarium as taking place in a 
mythicized northern Europe (Shippey xv-xvi), Middle-earth politics differs from that 
of medieval fantasy literature in important ways. In some northern European 
traditions, societies chose leaders through acclamation rather than heredity. Rulers 
would build support by distributing patronage to elites. The most famous 
example appears in Beowulf, where we see King Hrothgar "dol[ing] out rings and 
torques" (line 80), as well as Beowulf's own ascension to the kingship.3 By contrast, 
we observe very little patronage politics or elite bargaining in Middle-earth. Kings 
tend to ascend to the throne through heredity, not acclamation.4 Even more 
surprisingly, both the Shire and Lake-town do have relatively modern democratic 
governments, which would have been anachronistic in medieval literature.
How should we understand regime types in Middle-earth? What factors 
shape the relationship between subjects and rulers? Neither the medieval setting nor 
analogies to modern politics allow provides satisfactory answers. In this paper, I take 
an alternative approach by using the political science literature. Even in the 
"mundane world," political scientists cannot always obtain information about how 
political systems operate. Not all governments are transparent and some of the most 
important political negotiations occur behind closed doors. The discipline has 
developed statistical and game theoretic models in order to make inferences about 
political behavior. These methods can help compensate for the lack of detail about 
politics in Tolkien's work and uncover the underlying logic of political behavior in 
Middle-earth.
Beyond Democracy & Dictatorship: Why the King should return
Despite the existence of democracy in Middle-earth, the modern dichotomy 
between democracy and dictatorship/authoritarianism fails to capture key aspects 
of politics in Middle-earth. Although humans, Elves, and Dwarves are called the 
"Free Peoples" of Middle-earth (e.g., LotR II.iii.275), they do not have democratic 
governments. The two most common measures of democratization, Polity and 
Freedom House scores (see Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 1-3; Freedom House), would 
likely classify Mordor, Gondor, Rohan, and the Elven realms as "authoritarian." In 
addition, Middle-earth societies are not egalitarian; characters are conscious of class
3 Even some contemporary medieval fantasy touches upon these themes. T.H. White's The Once 
and Future King uses the Round Table to symbolize King Arthur's need to consult with advisors 
and elites.
4 There is one instance that superficially resembles acclamation, when Faramir asks a crowd 
outside the gates of Gondor if they accept Aragorn as king. However, Ioreth notes that this was 
"just a ceremony [...] for [Aragorn] has already entered" (LotR VI.5.967). In other words, 
acclamation does not actually confer power.
Mythlore 33.1, Fall/Winter 2014   103
Dominic J. Nardi, Jr.
and in some cases social mobility is limited (see Donnelly 18). Yet, Tolkien clearly 
does not ascribe the same normative value to democracy that Freedom House and 
Polity scores imply. In other words, Lake-town's government is not depicted as 
superior to Rohan's, despite Lake-town's status as a democracy.
In the "mundane world," political scientists have increasingly moved away 
from the dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism to focus on institutions 
more broadly across different regime types (e.g., Gandhi xix-xxi; Shapiro 326-329). For 
this paper, I define an "institution" as: 1) a relatively enduring set of rules and 
organized practices; 2) embedded in structures of meaning and resources; and 3) 
invariant in the face of personnel turnover and individual preferences (March and 
Olsen 3-4).5 Institutional rules define how political actions translate into outcomes. 
This definition is flexible enough to accommodate Middle-earth's relatively informal 
politics. An "institution" does not necessarily have to be a government body or actor, 
such as the stewardship of Gondor. For example, the oath that the Guards of the 
Citadel swear is an institution in that it is an organized practice that has endured 
under several generations of stewards.
Although political institutions can enable better governance outcomes, 
institutionalizing political relationships inevitably creates barriers between ruler 
and subject. For example, in presidential democracies, terms of office lock voters 
and politicians into a formal social contract that usually cannot be broken or 
amended until the next election (Mainwaring 199). If a new crisis arises or voters 
change their mind, voters are stuck with the leaders currently in power. Leaders 
elected to manage one problem might be poorly equipped to address the next— 
much as the Master fostered a thriving economy but proved inept at defending 
Lake-town against a dragon. This risk is mitigated to an extent in parliamentary 
systems, where the legislature can call for a vote of no confidence (see Strom 265). 
However, even snap elections are no guarantee that democracy is actually 
representative and accountable to the public. Voting rules affect voting outcomes 
such that the order and manner in which legislators vote can have a determinative 
effect on the outcome.6
It is possible to mitigate these problems, but only by limiting 
government representativeness, accountability, or efficiency. In the " mundane 
world," politicians establish rules, such as delegating authority to legislative 
committees, to prevent legislatures from constantly cycling through policies (Shepsle 
28). The committee can then use its specialized knowledge to narrow the range of 
options brought to a floor vote. However, this gives a subset of legislators
5 The third prong of this definition explains why this paper does not focus on the characteristics 
of individual leaders in Middle-earth. Although leadership is crucial, aspects of politics that 
depend upon a particular leader's preferences are not institutionalized.
6 As demonstrated by the infamous Condorcet Paradox.
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disproportionate power over the agenda. Democratic governments also regularly 
entrust unelected bureaucrats and judges to formulate policies and manage disputes 
(e.g., H uber and Shipan 2; Bickel 30). Although these institutional innovations can 
and sometimes do produce beneficial governance outcomes, they also complicate the 
notion that democracy enables direct interaction between citizens and political 
leaders.
In theory, elections should allow voters to hold corrupt politicians 
accountable (Ferraz and Finan 1274), but in practice elections can encourage 
corruption because politicians need funds in order to finance their campaigns. 
Empirically, long-established, liberal democracies tend to suffer less corruption, but 
there is considerable variation amongst younger democracies, some of which suffer 
extreme levels of corruption (Treisman 218-219). In open-list proportional 
representation systems, more competitive elections even appear to encourage more 
corruption; as the number of voters in a constituency increases, campaign finance 
violations also increase (Chang and Golden 115). Moreover, it is difficult for voters 
to hold leaders accountable for corruption because it occurs outside of public view (c.f. 
Cheibub and Przeworski 238).
Charismatic leaders can take advantage of this information asymmetry in 
order to distract voters from corruption or poor government performance. Problems 
can always be blamed on subversive groups or external forces. Such concerns lead some 
voters to only trust leaders who do not openly seek power. Tolkien himself appeared 
sympathetic to this view, remarking, "mediae v a ls  were only too right in taking nolo 
episcopari as the as the best reason a man could give to others for making him a 
bishop" (Letters 64). This of course gives politicians an incentive to—often 
disingenuously—disavow any interest in higher office, further distorting the 
relationship between ruler and subject. 7
Nor is democracy necessarily a precondition for economic growth and 
good governance. Some research suggests that democracy increases provision of 
public goods, such as education and healthcare (see, e.g., Sen 16; Przeworski and 
Limongi 168-169; Lake and Baum 617-618; Blaydes and Kayser 2). However, other 
scholars have challenged these results for underrepresenting high-performing 
authoritarian regimes (Ross 863-864) and oversimplifying measures for democracy 
(Cheibub et al. 68). Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, several autocracies, 
including China, have provided economic growth and public goods provision at 
least as well as the average democracy (Clark et al. 2-3).
More recent models suggest that political constraints, not regime type, 
provide the key to explaining government performance. In the Selectorate model
7 Frank Herbert's Dune novels explored the dangers of charismatic leaders, leading him to 
observe in Chapterhouse Dune: "It is not that power corrupts but that it is magnetic to the 
corruptible" (59).
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(see de Mesquita et al. 77-105), a leader must maximize his/her support by 
distributing patronage to the group that selects the leader (i.e., the selectorate). 
He/she must distribute enough to thwart potential challengers. The larger the 
selectorate, the greater the incentive to enact policies benefitting the populace at 
large rather than engaging in embezzlement. In democracies, the selectorate tends to 
encompass the entire voting-age populace. In a similar model, Myerson (134-135) 
shows that, in the face of competition, rulers have an incentive to establish a strong 
royal court to serve as a commitment to supporters. These models are particularly 
helpful for Middle-earth because they demonstrate that one does not need democracy 
or even formal institutions in order to constrain political rulers.
Democracy in Middle-earth: Who elected the Master?
Given these insights from the political science literature, it is worth 
reexamining the problem of democracy in Tolkien's legendarium. Tolkien does not use 
the failure of democracy or political leaders in Middle-earth as an excuse to accept 
dictatorship. In fact, we see subjects and subordinates actively resisting bad 
government. Both Eomer and Beregond dissent against unwise orders when the kings 
of Rohan and Gondor fall under corrupt influences (Grima Wormtongue and the 
palantir, respectively). After a brief punishment, both are rehabilitated and their dissent 
at least partially legitimated. In The Return of the King, the Hobbits even launch an 
insurgency against Sharkey and his thugs. As Curry notes, "what is 'The Scouring of the 
Shire' [...] but an account of local resistance to fascist thuggery and forced 
modernization?" (41).
Perhaps the greatest challenge to democracy comes from Lake-town. According to 
Blackburn, the contrast between the Master and Bard suggests that:
what is wrong with democracy is that it carries to power, not those who have the
best right to rule as stewards of the common good, but those who, through the
power of their eloquence, are able to manipulate the ignorant masses. (64)
However, even here it appears that the problem is in how Lake-town institutionalized 
democracy rather than popular participation generally. The narrator in The Hobbit tells 
the reader that the Master owed his position to "trade and tolls, to cargoes and gold" 
(Hobbit X.210). This could simply mean that residents approved the Master's 
management of the economy, but could also imply that the Master used patronage to 
influence the outcome of elections. Moreover, the Master does not internalize popular 
sentiment in order to deliberate on policy, but rather follows the "general clamour" 
(X.211). By contrast, the restoration of monarchy does not lead to the abolition of 
popular participation. When Bard is described as rewarding "his followers and friends 
freely" (XVIII.304), it is hard not to see hints of the Selectorate model's informal 
constraints and patronage politics.
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Some of Tolkien’s letters do express skepticism of democracy. In a 1944 letter 
to his son Christopher, he points out that the Greek word for democracy 
(δημοχρατὶα) better translates as “mob-rule” (Letters 107). In discussing Hobbit 
values, he declares, “Not that I am a ‘democrat’ in any of its current uses […]” (215). 
However, a closer analysis suggests that Tolkien’s criticism centers on modern, 
institutionalized democracy, not on popular participation in governance. This is 
perhaps best expressed in a 1956 letter, where he claims, “I am not a ‘democrat’ 
only because ‘humility’ and equality are spiritual principles corrupted by the attempt 
to mechanize and formalize them” (246, emphasis added). In this context, the failure of 
Lake-town stems from the lack of a dialogue between government and the people; the 
Master follows the forms of democracy, but does not provide leadership (i.e., “mob-
rule”). 
Tolkien describes his own political leanings as “more and more to Anarchy 
(philosophically understood, meaning abolition of control […])—or to 
‘unconstitutional’ Monarchy” (Letters 63). Political scientists would typically place 
“unconstitutional monarchy” and “anarchy” near opposite ends of the political 
spectrum (in fact, dictators often equate “democracy” with “anarchy”). However, by 
grouping these two regime types together, Tolkien is emphasizing his aversion to 
institutionalization. During the 1930s and 1940s, the world’s major democracies had 
drastically expended the size and scope of government in response to the Great 
Depression and World War II. Totalitarianism, with its regimentation of society, 
represented an even more extreme form of institutionalization. For somebody who 
preferred deinstitutionalized politics, neither option was a viable alternative. 
Ultimately, Tolkien’s legendarium is not a political manifesto8 and does not 
attempt to solve the problems of institutionalized democracy. Taken literally, The Lord of 
the Rings would be, as Blackburn claims, “dangerous as a guide to deeds” (62). 
However, the legendarium is politically salient in that it engages with broader political 
themes. Indeed, in his skepticism of government, Tolkien shares some of the same 
concerns that motivated Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s book Governing the Commons. 
Ostrom (30-38) argues that community policing can prove more effective in managing 
natural resources than either state control or privatization. Her approach does not work 
under all conditions and is probably only applicable to smaller communities. 
Nevertheless, her scholarship is useful in that it demonstrates the possibility for 





                                           
8 Especially when compared to Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, published shortly after The Lord of the 
Rings. 
Dominic J. Nardi, Jr.
Va r i a t i o n  i n  In s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n : Ri n g w r a i t h s  a s  b u r e a u c r a t s
In this section, I consider how political institutions vary in The Lord of the 
Rings.9 In Middle-earth, the most important indicators of institutionalization are: 1) 
the ability of subjects and rulers to interact, 2) the formality of political processes, 
and 3) the layers of bureaucracy. Ideally, political relationships between ruler and 
subjects involve two-way communication (see Figure 1). Rulers transmit commands 
to the populace through laws, bureaucracy, speeches, or propaganda. At the same 
time, rulers need information about subjects' preferences to ensure that they do 
not become so dissatisfied as to attempt regime change. Subjects can also provide 
rulers with useful insight about the enforcement and impact of government policies 





Figure 1: Model of Interaction between Ruler and Subject
Governments need to find an equilibrium between command and feedback. 
Relying solely on information provided by subjects risks mob rule. The U.S. 9
9 It is w o rth  discussing w hat constitutes dom estic politics in  th is context. Sovereignty in  M iddle- 
earth  appears m ore fluid th an  the norm  for m odern  nation-states. For exam ple, as k ing of 
G ondor, Elessar is expected to keep the peace on  roads as far n o rth  as R ivendell (LotR VI.6.988) 
an d  prohibits M en from  entering the  Shire (App.B.1097). Despite this, Shire Hobbits never 
behave as if they  owe allegiance to Gondor. The Shire has its ow n governm ent, w hich  regulates 
all dom estic m atters. G ondor only seems involved in  the  Shire's interaction w ith  the  outside 
w orld.
In  general, I consider a realm  sufficiently autonom ous if  there is a governm ent that 
regulates dom estic affairs and there appears to be  no  overlapping dom estic jurisdiction w ith  
another governm ent. Accordingly, it w ould  be m ore appropria te  to characterize the  Gondor- 
Shire relationship as international, even if nom inally  the Shire falls under G ondor's aegis. In the 
"m undane  w orld ," such inform al relations betw een great pow ers and  tributaries w ere not 
uncom m on before the  1648 Treaty of W estphalia. Even in  the 21st century, the  U nited States 
p rovides public goods and  security to  other states, such as patrolling international w aterw ays.
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Founding Fathers created a representative government in order to receive information 
about citizens' preferences, but combined it with checks and balances to avoid a 
tyranny of the majority (e.g., Madison No. 51). Authoritarian regimes also need 
feedback, but subjects are less likely to volunteer information that contradicts or 
criticizes official policy for fear of retribution. This makes gathering accurate 
information more costly (see Kuran 30-31).10 Some authoritarian regimes establish 
"democratic" institutions, such as legislatures, in order to interact with citizens 
and gather information (e.g. Gandhi xix-xxi). Governments can also attempt to 
compensate by creating a vast surveillance apparatus to spy on the populace.
In Middle-earth, there is considerable variation in the extent to which 
governments can issue commands and receive feedback (see Figure 2). At one 
extreme, Mordor has a complex political hierarchy with many bureaucratic layers. 
Although we learn relatively little about Mordor, we encounter courtiers (e.g., the 
Mouth of Sauron), bureaucratic agents (e.g., Ringwraiths), tributary states (e.g., 
Harad), elite soldiers (e.g., trolls), and common troops (e.g., Orcs). Not only is the 
hierarchy rigid, but different classes are also strictly segregated by race. There is no 
permeability across class lines. Although Orcs might sometimes informally converse 
amongst themselves, we never observe Ringwraiths or Orc chieftains—much less 













Figure 2: Feedback vs. Command in Middle-earth Realms
(Placements along the axes are approximations.)
10 It is this tendency that forces King Henry to dress as a commoner in order to learn about his 
soldiers' fears on the eve of battle in Shakespeare's King Henry VIII.
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Sauron's oppression stifles informational communication between subjects 
and ruler. This is not a polity in which subjects willingly volunteer information 
likely to upset elites. Two of the Mordor Orcs, Shagrat and Gorbag, are forced to 
whisper their belief that "even the Biggest, can make mistakes" (LotR IV.10.738), as 
if acknowledging the fallibility of a leader is cause for punishment. To compensate, 
Sauron expends considerable effort conducting surveillance over his realm. As 
Shagrat claims, "they've got eyes and ears everywhere" (IV.10.737). In Tolkien's 
legendarium, Mordor's omnipresent surveillance apparatus is symbolized by 
references to the "Eye of Sauron."11 However, Sauron's efforts ultimately fail. 
Throughout The Lord of the Rings, he consistently lacks crucial information about 
the Ring and the intentions of the protagonists. He could not even detect the 
presence of the Hobbits in Mordor until Frodo puts on the Ring in Orodruin.1 2
Isengard's political structure resembles Mordor's, but with fewer layers of 
hierarchy. Saruman, the undisputed leader, has a courtier (e.g., Grima Wormtongue), 
soldiers (e.g., Uruk-hai), and mercenaries (e.g., the Dunlendings). Again, there is no 
evidence of social mobility. Although Saruman and Wormtongue do interact, theirs is 
not an informal, personal relationship. Saruman constantly emphasizes his 
superiority over Wormtongue by issuing arbitrary and abusive commands, such as 
the order to kill Lotho Sackville-Baggins. Saruman shows little interest in receiving 
feedback from Wormtongue about his policies, going so far as to taunt Wormtongue 
for obeying his commands (LotR VI.8.1020). After Sharkey seizes control of Bag-End, 
he symbolically and practically cuts himself off from feedback by not revealing 
himself to the Hobbits and pretending that Lotho remains in charge.
Gondor and Rohan lie in between the extremes. Both have several layers of 
government, including a king, advisors, and generals, but Rohan's hierarchy is 
much more horizontal than Gondor's. Before marching to Gondor, Theoden has to 
call upon his vassals to muster their soldiers to Dunharrow. By contrast, Gondor has 
a relatively centralized command and control structure, allowing the ruler to 
summon troops from outlying territories. Moreover, Gondor has more levels of 
hierarchy, including lesser nobles (e.g., Prince Imrahil) and lords of cities (e.g., 
Faramir of Osgiliath). In fact, the Council of Gondor is the only formal political 
institution mentioned in the entire legendarium. However, unlike Mordor, Gondorian 
subjects can not only interact with the elite, but also join it. For example, Beregond—a 
"plain man of arms" with "neither rank nor lordship" (LotR V.1.767)—was promoted 
to Captain of the White Company after saving Faramir.
11 In Peter Jackson's The Lord of the Rings film adaptations, this Literally becomes a giant flaming 
eyeball.
12 Although Shagrat brings Frodo's Mithril shirt, Elven cloak, and sword to Lugburz, the Mouth 
of Sauron clearly does not know the Hobbits' true mission. As Gandalf says, "Indeed, I know 
them all and all their history, and despite your scorn, foul Mouth of Sauron, you cannot say as 
much" (LotR V.10.889).
110   Mythlore 125, Fall/Winter 2014
Political Institutions in  Tolkien's Middle-earth: or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying
The parallel oaths that Merry and Pippin swear allow for a direct 
comparison of institutionalization in Gondor and Rohan. In Rohan, Merry simply 
asks King Theoden, "May I lay the sword of Meriadoc of the Shire on your lap 
[...]?" With equal informality, Theoden replies, "Gladly I will take it" (LotR 
V.2.777). The oath is not a precondition for Merry to serve and interact with 
Theoden, but rather formalizes a relationship that had developed through 
conversations about pipeweed and other lighthearted subjects. Where the Rohirrim 
oath is informal and personal, the Gondorian process is formal and formulaic. Pippin 
swears fealty to Denethor by reciting:
Here do I swear fealty and service to Gondor, and to the Lord and Steward 
of the realm, to speak and to be silent, to do and to let be, to come and to 
go, in need or plenty, in peace or war, in living or dying, from this hour 
henceforth, until my lord release me, or death take me, or the world end. So 
say I, Peregrin son of Paladin of the Shire of the Halflings. (LotR V.1.756)
Denethor's response is equally formal and formulaic:
And this do I hear, Denethor son of Ecthelion, Lord of Gondor, Steward of the 
High King, and I will not forget it, nor fail to reward that which is given: 
fealty with love, valour with honour, oath-breaking with vengeance. (756)
Unlike M erry's oath, Pippin's is part of a scripted ritual in which all soldiers of 
Gondor must partake; the oath itself is an institution. Pippin and Denethor did not 
have a preexisting friendship before the oath and afterwards only interact pursuant to 
the fulfillment of their vows. The oath also rigidly delineates responsibilities of 
both the ruler and subject, further separating the two and reducing the space for 
personal, informal interactions.
Gondor and Rohan demonstrate how institutionalization can lead to a 
principal-agent problem. In theory, a bureaucratic agent should act in the best 
interests of the ruler. In practice, an agent's preferences might diverge from the 
ruler's (see Fearon 55-60). For example, Wormtongue would distort and reinterpret 
information before passing it on to Theoden. Thus, when Gandalf arrives, he m ust 
to remove that layer of bureaucracy in order to ensure that Theoden receives his 
message. In Gondor, the palantir erects a similar barrier to communication. Like 
Wormtongue, the palantir has a different agenda from Denethor. The palantir does 
not actually present untruth, but does tint information with despair. By the siege of 
Gondor, Denethor becomes so dependent upon the palantir that he refuses advice 
from Faramir before the attack on Osgiliath and from Pippen before nearly 
burning Faramir alive. In short, Denethor no longer invests in relationships with 
subjects for information.
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Aragorn's ascension to the throne seems to promise a relatively less 
formal political relationship with his subjects, but he does not completely abolish 
formality. His coronation ceremony is marked by ritual, including trumpets, flower­
laden streets, and a formal recitation in Elvish (LotR VI.5.967). Indeed, as 
Aragorn nears Gondor, he transitions to speaking in more form al-even  regal— 
diction. Although there are crucial differences between Denethor and Aragorn's 
reigns, there are also deeper political institutions and rituals in Gondor that do not 
disappear after leadership turnover.
Lake-town under the Master represents another extreme, government ruled 
by feedback—or "mob rule." Although Lake-town's government is relatively 
underinstitutionalized, those institutions that do exist do not facilitate two-way 
communication. The Master follows the whims of his subjects, presumably to 
guarantee his reelection. When Thorin and company arrive in The Hobbit, the narrator 
reveals that the Master doubted Thorin's claims to kingship. However, rather than 
express his doubts and encourage a debate as to the wisdom of entering the Lonely 
Mountain, he simply follows the "general clamour" (Hobbit X.211). He is also pays too 
much heed to "trade and tolls" (210)—the electorate's short-term concerns—rather 
than making the grim but foresighted preparations to defend the town. Ironically, 
despite his title, the "Master" is unable to issue unpopular commands or demand 
sacrifices from his subjects.
Finally, the Shire has "hardly any 'government'" (LotR Prologue 9), 
making for a relatively flat political structure. The only political hierarchy is an 
elected Mayor, the Thain, and Shirriffs. By the War of the Ring, only twelve 
Shirriffs remained in service and the Thainship had become largely honorific. The 
Mayor's duties are limited to managing banquets, the Messenger Service, the 
Watch, and animal control (LotR Prologue 10). The government serves a role in 
coordinating and managing public services, but appears to have little institutional 
power to mobilize or extract resources from Shire society. Although economic and 
social inequality do exist in the Shire, there is evidence of significant social mobility. 
Sam Gamgee, the archetypal working class Hobbit,13 is elected mayor for seven 
seven-year terms. The Shire's minimalist government does come with a cost; as with 
Lake-town, the Shire government has insufficient command ability to defend against 
external threats (although Mayor Will Whitfoot does earn readers' sympathy for 
defying Lotho).
13 The Silmarillion's brief synopsis about the War of the Ring refers to Sam merely as Frodo's 
"servant" (303).
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Or i g i n s  o f  Go v e r n m e n t : Wh y  t h e  Sh i r e  i s  a  d e m o c r a c y
In this section, I offer one possible causal explanation for institutional variation 
in Middle-earth based on a game theoretic model adapted from the economics 
literature (see Hirschman 1). There are two players in the Exit, Voice, & Loyalty game: 
a Ruler and a group of Subjects. Before the game begins, the Ruler issues a policy that 
costs the Subjects 1 unit of welfare (i.e., in rights or property loss). The Subjects can 
then choose to: 1) voice their dissatisfaction, 2) remain loyal to the Ruler, or 3) 
exit from the state. In the latter two scenarios, the game ends and both players 
receive a payoff (see Figure 3). If the Subjects choose voice, the Ruler can either: 1) 
respond to the demands, or 2) ignore them. If the Ruler responds, then the 
Subjects remain loyal and both players receive a payoff. If the Ruler ignores them, 
the Subjects must again choose to: 1) remain loyal, or 2) exit the state.
Legend Parameters:
E Citizen’s exit payoff
1 Value of benefit taken from the citizen by the state 
L State’s value from having a loyal citizen who does not exit 
C Cost of using voice for the citizen
Figure 3: Exit, Voice, & Loyalty Model
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Ultimately, the Ruler and Subjects make their decisions based on the 
expected payoff at each stage of the game.14 If the Subjects receive some positive 
value from exiting (E > 0), they would prefer to exit rather than remain loyal (E -  
C > 0 -  C). Likewise, if there are significant costs associated with exit (E < 0), then 
the Subjects would prefer to remain loyal. If the Ruler responds, then the 1 unit of 
welfare is returned to the Subjects. However, using voice is costly because Subjects 
must expend resources (C) in order to mobilize. Thus, the Subjects will only voice 
dissent if the value of what they lost is greater than the benefit of either loyalty or 
exit (1 -  C > E > 0 or 1 -  C > 0 > E).
After appropriating the citizen's assets, the Ruler receives that 1 unit of 
welfare. If the Subjects remain loyal, the Ruler receives a value for their loyalty and 
service (L). Thus, the Ruler has an incentive to prevent the Subjects from exiting the 
state. If the Ruler values the Subjects' loyalty more than the welfare seized (L > 1), 
he/she might be willing to respond to their grievances (i.e., return the 1 unit of 
welfare) in order to prevent them from fleeing. If this game were extended beyond 
one round, the Ruler might need a way to commit to not seizing the Subjects' 
assets in order to prevent them from protesting or exiting in the first place. This 
might lead the establishment of democracy or a constitution, which would impose 
institutional constraints on government discretion (see North and Weingast 805-808).
In the "m undane world," we cannot obtain precise values for E, C, or 
L, but we can estimate the relative values based on the bargaining power of 
subjects. From the perspective of the ruler, the benefit of subjects' loyalty (L) 
depends upon the ease with which the state can extract resources and services. If 
subjects can hide their assets or flee, then it becomes more important for the state 
to retain loyalty in order to prevent capital flight or labor loss (see, e.g., Scott 106). If 
the ruler has access to natural resource rents or slave labor, then he/she does not 
require subjects' loyalty in order to obtain revenue and services.
Subjects who are more willing and able to leave a polity have a higher exit 
value (E) and thus more bargaining power vis-a-vis the ruler. Exit is easier when 
subjects possess portable assets that can be taken in the event of flight. By contrast, 
loyalty becomes more attractive when dangers outside the polity threaten the 
subjects' person or property. In such cases, subjects are more likely to cede power to 
the state and allow it to develop stronger institutions in return for protection (see 
Tilly 170-175; Slater 5). The costs of voice (C) depend on the ability of subjects to 
organize and mobilize themselves. If subjects are relatively self-sufficient and can 
survive without assistance from the state, then they face less risk of retribution.
Geography has a particularly important impact on these parameters. 
Harsh or rugged terrain can impede government efforts to control subjects, while
14 Technically, if this were not a game of complete information, one would also need to calculate 
each player's beliefs about the other player's choices.
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fertile lands can allow subjects to grow their own crops and become self-sufficient. 
Fortunately, Tolkien was famously meticulous in the care with which he depicted 
Middle-earth geography, going so far as to include maps in his books (see generally 
Fonstad ix-x). Although Tolkien certainly did not have the Exit, Voice, Loyalty 
model in m ind when writing, because he took such care with the geography it is 
reasonable to extrapolate how geography might have affected the development of 
political institutions in Middle-earth.
The Shire's geography makes it ideally suited to decentralized, democratic 
government. The Shire is described as a hilly area. Most Hobbits — especially the 
richest and poorest—build their homes in holes in the ground rather than external 
structures (LotR Prologue 7). This makes it relatively easy for Hobbits to hide 
themselves and their assets from inspection. The government cannot simply observe 
a Hobbit's fields or house to assess his or her wealth. Indeed, after Bilbo returned 
from Erebor, the other Hobbits knew he had obtained some treasure, b u t they 
could not ascertain the extent of his wealth (I.1.23). Hobbits are also secretive and so 
skilled in "the art of disappearing" that humans rarely see them (Prologue 1). 
Thus, exiting and escaping government oversight is relatively easy. In order to 
convince Hobbits to remain loyal, the government m ust make the Shire an appealing 
place in which to live—as it seems to have done, given Frodo and Sam's longing 
descriptions of their homeland.
Hobbits also demonstrate both the means and the will to voice dissent 
against oppressive government. The Shire has fertile cropland and can grow enough 
food for subsistence (LotR Prologue 9), meaning that individual Hobbit families do 
not require government assistance. Hobbits are frequently depicted engaging in 
collective activities, including banquets, showing that private citizens can and do 
organize mass events. It took Lotho the assistance of armed human ruffians and 
Saruman to impose an economic system that does "more gathering than sharing" 
(VI.7.999). Despite that advantage, the Hobbits could still engage in massive, 
widespread resistance and overthrow the Lotho-Sharkey regime. In the long run 
authoritarianism is simply not a stable equilibrium in the Shire.
Lake-town geography appears to have a similar effect, but for different 
reasons. Living on a lake makes exit easier as subjects can hide their assets 
underwater or flee using their boats.15 Before Smaug's attack, Lake-town has 
bountiful resources, including fish. The residents discount Bard's prophesies of 
"anything from floods to poisoned fish," suggesting neither had happened recently 
(Hobbit XIV.258). Assuming residents have access to fishing gear and boats, they are
15 This occurred in Peter Jackson's film adaptation, The Desolation of Smaug, when Bard hides 
weapons in the water under his house.
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not dependent upon the Master for their livelihoods.16 As in the Shire, the people of 
Lake-town demonstrate their autonomy by overthrowing the Master and installing 
Bard as king. It is noteworthy that the only two examples of successful domestic 
revolutions in Tolkien's legendarium occur in the two states with the least costly exit 
options.
At the opposite extreme, Mordor's geography facilitates totalitarianism 
and stifles resistance. The Plains of Gorgoroth are described as deserts where 
nothing grows and the water is bitter (LotR VI.2.923). Rather, food comes from 
"slave-worked fields" in the Lake Nurnen region, giving the state a monopoly over the 
supply and distribution of provisions—and making Orcs dependent on the state for 
their livelihoods. Despite the low quality of life, exit is not feasible. Outside 
Mordor, Elves, Men, and Dwarves kill Orcs indiscriminately, to the extent that elf- 
countries instill a "cold fear" (LotR VI.1.907). As such, defection to neighboring states 
is not an option. By contrast, as part of Sauron's army, Orcs not only receive 
collective defense, but also war booty. Thus, even if they evade Mordor's internal 
surveillance system, the benefits of fleeing Mordor are low compared to those of 
remaining loyal.
If Orcs were to attempt flight, Mordor's geography makes doing so nearly 
impossible. Mordor is enclosed by the Ered Lithui ("Ash Mountains") in the north 
and the Ephel Duath ("Fence of Shadow") in the west and the south, blocking 
overland passage. The only accessible exits are through the heavily guarded Black 
Gate (Morannon), Minas Morgul, or Shelob's lair. Aside from Orodruin, the land 
within the boundaries of Mordor is flat and barren, providing the "Eye" of Sauron an 
unobstructed view of any point within his realm. Indeed, Shagrat and Gorbag express 
a desire to desert, but fear that they would be caught (LotR IV.10.738). For Sauron, 
Orcs are expendable, in part because he can recruit additional mercenaries from Harad 
and Rhun. In short, Sauron has no incentive to accommodate any Orc demands for 
greater rights or share of the booty because Orcs have no bargaining power.
Rohan's geography makes a relatively decentralized government likely, but 
still allows for monarchy. Rohan is covered by a vast plains situated in a vale between 
the Misty Mountains and the White Mountains. This has two important implications. 
First, as in the Shire, the fertile plains provide greater agricultural opportunities, 
allowing farmers to be relatively self-sufficient. This prevents Rohirrim from being 
too dependent upon the king. In fact, the king is dependent upon vassals to supply 
military forces (see LotR V.3 "The Muster of Rohan"). Second, the land is suitable for
16 There are other hints that Lake-town was not poor. The narrator notes that the people of Lake- 
town "still throve on the trade" [emphasis added] (Hobbit X.204). They even have enough spare 
resources to supply Thorin's company and dress them "in fine cloth of their proper colours" 
(emphasis added, X.211). Interestingly, The Desolation of Smaug depicts Lake-town as an 
authoritarian state in which resources are scarce. The Master rejects elections and has a vast spy 
network. Bard threatens Alfred with food riots if he cannot bring his fish past the tollgate.
116   Mythlore 125, Fall/Winter 2014
Political Institutions in  Tolkien's Middle-earth: or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying
horses and Rohan is a horse culture. Horses provide the Rohirrim with much greater 
mobility, making both collective mobilization and flight easier. However, both horses 
and farmland are observable—and hence taxable-assets, giving the king some 
leverage in extracting resources from his subjects.
Gondor's geography allows for more centralized government than Rohan's. 
The Pelennor Fields are relatively fertile, providing sustenance for Gondorians. 
However, the realm of Gondor is spread out along the edges of the White 
Mountains, the Anduin River, and Bay of Belfalas; with a population spread over 
such a large area, it is relatively difficult for citizens to engage in collective 
mobilization.17 Perhaps the most important feature of Gondor's geography is its 
location opposite the Black Gates. As Boromir points out, Gondor has long served 
as the front line of defense against Sauron's forces (LotR II.2.245). Given the outside 
threat, exit is a less attractive option. Gondorians are more willing to cede wealth and 
power to the state in return for protection, allowing rulers to fund massive 
infrastructure projects like the Great Gate of Minas Tirith.
Following this logic, we should expect the Rohirrim to be more likely to voice 
dissent against oppressive or arbitrary rule than the Men of Gondor. Although the 
Rohirrim do not collectively initiate open revolt against Grima Wormtongue, some 
individuals do engage in active or passive resistance. Eomer questions decisions 
Theoden made while under Wormtongue's influence and is subsequently exiled. 
Later, Hama permits Gandalf to bring his staff into Meduseld, disobeying clear 
orders to the contrary. By contrast, in Gondor there is no purely indigenous 
resistance against Denethor's reckless decisions. Faramir obeys Denethor's orders 
to recapture Osgiliath, despite his better judgment. Beregond only attempts to 
prevent Denethor from burning Faramir at Pippin's urging. Unlike Eomer and 
Hama, who were not punished for their dissent, Aragorn prohibits Beregond from ever 
setting foot in Minas Tirith (although this is coupled with a promotion to captain).
We know relatively little about the internal politics of Isengard, but there is 
some evidence to suggest exit is relatively costly. The tower of Orthanc is surrounded 
by the Ring of Isengard, a large, circular stone wall. The only exit points are the River 
Isen and the Gate of Isengard, making exit from the immediate vicinity difficult. The 
area surrounding Isengard was originally covered by forest, which would have made 
exit and hiding easier. However, Saruman cut most of the trees down in order to fuel 
his war machines, incidentally also making it easier for Saruman to track his 
subordinates. Moreover, just as Mordor Orcs fear the Elves, any Uruk-hai and Wild 
Men who flee Isengard would confront the Rohirrim, who in the The Two Towers hunt
17 The Druadan Forest provides an instructive counterexample. Although in Gondor, is much 
more difficult for governments to penetrate forests, allowing the Woses (Wild Men of the 
Woods) to live there in autonomy. They appear to have no allegiance to Gondor, even when 
they find out that Minas Tirith is under attack.
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and kill a band of Uruk-hai merely for trespassing on Rohan territory. Although not 
quite as difficult as in Mordor, Orcs have relatively little incentive to flee or resist 
Saruman. Wormtongue's spiteful comments against Saruman are the only visible 























Figure 4: Exit vs. Resistance in Middle-earth Realms
(Placements along the axes are approximations.)
Following this analysis, there is indeed a correlation between the cost of exit 
as determined by geography and the amount of resistance to oppressive or arbitrary 
government (see Figure 4). However, I certainly do not mean to imply geographic 
determinism. Other potential factors, such as leadership, can and do matter. For 
example, the Master could have tried to emphasize the threat of the dragon in order to 
militarize Lake-town and quell any opposition to his power. Instead, he chooses to 
ignore the threat, diminishing the effect that Lake-town's proximity to the Lonely 
Mountain has on local politics. The game theoretic model simply demonstrates that 
under certain conditions leaders' choices are constrained by geography and other 
variables.
Elven Exceptionalism: Mortal politics, immortal Elves
The Elven realms do not quite fit into my theoretical framework. They are 
not democratic. Both Rivendell and Lothlorien have highly centralized governments, 
with leaders who remain in power for centuries (i.e., Elrond and Galadriel), despite 
very different geographies. Despite this, and contrary to what Barnett claims, Elven 
realms are not "essentially totalitarian" (385). Elven leaders are highly consensual,
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even to the point of refusing to impose their will on others (Ruane and James 22). For 
example, when Elrond chairs the Council, he allows the various parties—including 
Dwarves and M en—to participate in the debate, even though given the circumstances 
he might have been justified in invoking emergency powers to expedite the meeting. 
Upon meeting Gildor, Frodo recalls an adage that one should not go "to the elves for 
counsel, for they will say both no and yes" (LotR I.3.84).
Current political science tools are simply not properly equipped to analyze 
immortal beings such as Elves. Models such as Exit, Voice, and Loyalty assume that 
participants have relatively short time horizons. Rulers find political power valuable 
because they can use it to enact policy change or extract resource rents. Abuse of 
power, such as theft of public property or natural resource destruction, might be 
attractive because the perpetrators receive immediate gains but do not have to deal 
with the long-term consequences. However, because Elves are immortal, they have 
much longer time horizons. In theory, Elven rulers and subjects could find 
themselves interacting over an infinite period of time. In this respect, although 
Hobbits and Orcs are both fantastical races, they more closely resemble humans than 
Elves do.18
Immortality could lead to a very different equilibrium in a game theoretic 
model as players revise their expectations over time. For example, Axelrod and 
Hamilton (1393-1395) show that, over the long run, there are viable strategies that 
lead to more cooperative outcomes in non-cooperative game theoretic models. If one 
player behaves non-cooperatively, then the other player can inflict a punishment 
during future rounds. Thus, reputation becomes crucial to deterring bad behavior. 
Something similar might have occurred amongst the Elves. In The Silmarillion, Elves 
initially appear interested in worldly power; even Galadriel yearns for a realm of her 
own (84). The Noldor attack other Elves who refuse to aid their quest for the 
Silmarils, leading to the Kinslayings. Ultimately, the decline in the Noldor's 
reputation and the madness wrought by Feanor's oath serves as a lesson in the costs 
of non-cooperative behavior. By the Second Age, the Elves had settled into a more 
consensual and peaceful pattern of politics.
Conclusions: What the Two Towers can teach the Ivory Tower
In this paper, I offer one possible causal explanation for the political 
behaviors we observe in Middle-earth. I cannot and do not claim that Tolkien 
consciously or even unconsciously used such reasoning in writing his legendarium. 
Rather, the point of this exercise is to demonstrate that there is a logic to politics in 
Middle-earth that is, at the least, not inconsistent with the political science literature.
18 Sauron is also immortal, but because his subjects are mortal a single-round game still applies. 
Immortality simply gives Sauron an even greater bargaining position because he can outwait 
any Orc demands for greater rights or resources.
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As noted above, the dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism 
breaks down in Middle-earth. Instead, the more salient difference is the extent to 
which relationships between ruler and subject are institutionalized. In some polities, 
such as Mordor, relations are formal and the obstructed by multiple layers of 
hierarchy. By contrast, in the Shire, government is decentralized and flat. Moreover, 
as anticipated by the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty model, Middle-earth realms with a more 
mobile and empowered citizenry are more likely to have less institutionalized 
governments. Finally, I posit that immortality might make Elves more cooperative 
over the longer term.
Ultimately, we should not expect speculative fiction to be perfectly 
consistent with political science. As the Elven example demonstrates, there are 
sometimes differences between a subcreation and the "mundane world" that lead to 
divergent outcomes. Rather than preventing dialogue, this tension creates 
opportunities. One of the biggest challenges in political science is that we have 
limited counterfactuals. For example, we cannot compare economic growth in the 
United States under both democracy and dictatorship because historically only one 
possibility exists at a given time. Out of necessity, political scientists compare two 
different polities or time periods, but it is nearly impossible to control for all potential 
variables. By contrast, speculative fiction allows us to explore counterfactuals that we 
cannot replicate in the "mundane world" (i.e., it is easier to write about an Al Gore 
administration than to change the results of the 2000 election). As Ruby points out, 
"the only place in which [we] could explore the sociology of a situation that has not 
yet happened is in fiction" (128). Thoughtful sub-creation design can allow us to test 
political science with more interesting and rigorous counterfactuals.
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